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Introduction
The postwar international financial system went along with several 
“forums” of decision making, official as well as unofficial. Starting with the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, the 
World Bank), bi-lateral negotiations between the United States and the Euro-
pean countries took part in the “forum” for reconstruction; the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and the European Payments Union (EPU) 
began to play important roles in the 1950s; several “Groups”, from the G10, 
C20 to the G5, G7, faced the reform of the Bretton Woods System.
Of the above “forums”, one of the most enigmatic bodies was the Work-
ing Party 3 (WP3) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Set up in 1961 as a mere technical working group for 
the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) of the OECD, the WP3 soon became 
an important meeting place to discuss the overall strategies of the world 
economy. Chaired by Emile van Lennep (later Secretary General of the 
OECD), the WP3 brought together not only the brightest agents of the OECD 
member countries, but also representatives of the BIS and the IMF. In the 
Crisis Management in the International 
Monetary and Financial System: 
OECD Working Party 3 (1961-1979)
Kazuhiko YAGO
早稲田商学第 439号
2 0 1 4 年 3 月
316 早稲田商学第 439 号
1054
1970s, while the IMF was busy preparing the amendment of its Statutes due 
to the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed rate system, the WP3 acted as de 
facto crisis manager of the capitalist world and paved the way to the trans-
formation of economic policy in the 1980s towards deregulation and 
privatization. The precise context of the decision making in the WP3, how-
ever, has not been revealed from an historical point of view⑴. Relying on 
archival studies in the OECD, the BIS and other national archives, including 
newly released Bank of Japan materials, this paper tries to deal with this 
decision making process of the WP3.
Before entering in detail, let us describe our approaches in relation to 
recent studies on the subject and put it in a broader context of economic his-
tory and social sciences. 
An organisation in a general sense of word has long been an important 
object of historical study: state bureaucracy had been a source of inspiration 
in a tradition of German Historical School and sociology of Max Weber⑵. 
Business history, for example, treated an enterprise from various points of 
view, from a classical work of Alfred Chandler to more recent “organisational 
history” proposed by Louis Galambos and Patrick Fridenson⑶. Finally an indi-
vidual actor in history incarnated the organisation and networks: Olivier 
Feiertag has clearly presented a contemporary financial history through a 
biographical study of Wilfrid Baumgartner⑷, a French high ranking commis 
des finances. One of the most successful researches depending upon the 
─────────────────
⑴　A general view on the subject has been given by Peter Caroll and Aynsley Kellow, The 
OECD, A Study of Organisational Adaptation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, 2011. 
This is the most outstanding historical work on the OECD, but the archival sources are limited to 
the “C” series, which represents the official Ministerial Council documents, and therefore not nec-
essarily reflecting the more informal side of the organization. We are to study not only the “C” 
series but also the “CPE” series dealing with the WP3 and other lower-level commissions.
⑵　One of the most representative works on the subject by Max Weber is Soziologie der 
Herrschaft, which constitutes a chapter (Ch.2) in his great collection Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 
Tübingen, 1921-22.
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above approach to the international organisations is a collection on the his-
tory of the transnational ideas and movements during the interwar period, 
edited by Daniel Laqua⑸.
One question arises: when we look at an international organisation like 
the OECD, are we to treat it as “a tool” to serve someone’s interest, or “a 
forum” where several interests are coordinated? The former point of view, 
instrumentalism, represents a rather classical view, which finds many applied 
variation such as classical Marxist view of the state as of “a tool of the bour-
geoisie”, or a brand new corporate governance theory regarding an enterprise 
as a “tool to serve interests of shareholders”. Another view of an organisation, 
which regards the organisation as “a forum” is called pluralism. It provides 
more dynamic interpretation of history. Our approach to the history of the 
OECD is familiar to this pluralist view. In other words, we do not see the 
OECD-WP3 as a mere “tool” of some particular interest, e.g. the United 
States. What we focus is the process of coordination which took place in the 
OECD and a dynamics of organisation emerged in the process.
Another question may quickly follow the above one: who were the 
actors? While we talk about the “forum” function of the OECD, the actors of 
the decision makings have been, first of all, the representatives of the mem-
─────────────────
⑶　Cf. Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth: U.S. Business 
and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century, Basic Books, New York, 1988; For a methodological 
survey, cf. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Stuart Bruchey, Louis Galambos, eds., The Changing Economic 
Order : Readings in American Business and Economic History, Harcourt, Brace & World, New 
York, 1968. For a manifesto for organizational history in recent years, see Patrick Fridenson, “Un 
nouvel objet: l’organisation” in Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales, vol.44, no.6, novembre-décem-
bre 1989.
⑷　Olivier Feiertag, Wilfrid Baumgartner, un grand commis des finances à la croisée des pouvoirs 
(1902-1978), CHEFF, Paris, 2006.
⑸　Daniel Laqua, ed., Internationalism Reconfigured, Transnational ideas and Movements between 
the World Wars, I.B.Tauris, London/New York, 2011. See in particular Yann Decorzant, “Interna-
tionalism in Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations”, in Ibid.
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ber countries, the highest ranking of those gathered at the Ministerial Council 
Meetings (MCM). However, the decisions took place in the WP3, as we shall 
examine in the paper, have not been a mere average of the national interests 
of the member countries: it was something else, which even forwarded the 
contemporary ideas of growth and stability. Then who proposed and decided 
such a splendid idea? It was sometimes a representative of a member coun-
try, who committed himself rather deeply in the workings of the organisation, 
not in his particular home-country interest. Or it was an anonymous secretar-
iat view provided on the table of the MCM. Secretary-Generals, from 
Kristensen to Gurria, may have exerted influences⑹. Roles played by individ-
uals such as Emile van Lennep, Ottomar Emminger or Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing were also of importance. The only way to resolve the above com-
plexity of the decision-makings of the organisation is to rely on the archives, 
i.e. historical approach, which focuses on the actors through the lens of text-
critique⑺.
Let us then examine the “forum” function of the organisation more pre-
cisely in the context of contemporary international monetary and financial 
history.
Recent works on the history of international monetary and financial sys-
tem shed new light on the international institutions and “forums”: Barry 
Eichengreen, in his book discussing the Bretton Woods System referring to 
the debate over the “Bretton Woods II”, has given a precise explanation on 
─────────────────
⑹　Following figures have been Secretary-generals of the OECD: Thorkil Kristensen (1961-1969); 
Emile Van Lennep (1969-1984); Jean-Claude Paye (1984-1996); Donald Johnston (1996-2006) and 
Angel Gurria (2006- ). For an overview of their works during the terms, cf. Richard Woodward, 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Routledge, London/New 
York, 2009, pp.18-42.
⑺　A recent work by Gfeller focuses on the French diplomacy towards European unification at the 
time of the Oil Shock, referring to the French strategy over the OECD energy policy and oil 
sharing mechanism. Aurélie Elisa Gfeller, Building a European Identity: France, the United States, 
and the Oil Shock, 1973-1974, Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford, 2012.
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the Gold Pool⑻. Eichengreen, in this work presents a negative view on the 
“forum” like the Gold Pool, which failed to sustain the Bretton Woods system 
through international cooperation. Eichengreen’s view has been echoed by 
Catherine Schenk, who stressed the role of financial innovations by markets 
and banks in the 1970s and the ineffectiveness of capital control by govern-
ments as well as international organisations⑼. Above views represent a 
common understanding of historians on the limited role of institutional bodies 
in the international monetary and financial system: the change comes from 
the market, and the organisations or the “forums” respond in a passive and 
retarded manner.
However, different views have been proposed from the political economy 
approaches: Jeffrey Chwieroth, for example, explains that the innovation in 
the international organisations came “from within”, not from the outside 
market⑽. Relying on a constructivist and sociological approach, Chwieroth 
explains that the change in the IMF view from the capital movement restric-
tion to deregulation has been brought about through organisational conflict 
among various ideas within the institution. A similar approach has been 
applied by Rawi Abdelal, who explains the market-friendly IMF view after 
the 1990s as a product of French left wing politics (the “Paris consensus”) 
instead of the familiar American initiative (“Washington consensus”)⑾. 
Although the former Chwieroth criticizes Abdelal as taking an “insufficient” 
approach, these two recent works cast new light on the role of formal and 
informal institutions.
─────────────────
⑻　Barry Eichengreen, Global Imbalances and the Lesson of Bretton Woods, MIT Press Cam-
bridge, 2007.
⑼　Catherine Schenk, “Crisis and Opportunity: the Policy Environment of International Banking in 
the City of London, 1958-1980”, in Youssef Cassis and Eric Bussiere, eds., London and Paris as 
International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
⑽　Jeffrey Chwieroth, Capital Ideas, The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2010.
⑾　Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules, The Construction of Global Finance, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007.
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Our study stands in between the Eichengreen-Schenk historical/market 
view and the Chwieroth-Abdelal sociological/institutional view. The organisa-
tion in question, the WP3, was set up to respond to the crisis of the Bretton 
Woods system in the 1960s, and market forces pushed forward the financial 
innovation of the 1970s much faster and broader than the WP3 forecast. How-
ever, as we shall examine in the following sections, the WP3 itself proposed 
financial innovation, such as capital market deregulation, and in some aspects 
triggered market movement. The innovation proposal thus came “from 
within” the WP3, at least in some fields. Our paper aims to ascertain in which 
domain and how far the WP3 could enhance the market (or how far it 
retarded the market change), from the contemporary point of view, i.e. the 
view as seen by the actors in those historical phases.
Depending upon the above approaches, we are to answer the following 
questions:
(1)  The OECD in the 1960s set growth targets and was familiar with macro-
economic planning. A serious debate took place in the WP3 over how to 
define “growth”, and the WP3 in those days was regarded as Keynesian 
friendly. How did these ideas and culture change in the 1970s?
(2)  The WP3 had been under the strong influence of the EEC Monetary 
Committee led by Emile van Lennep⑿ and Ottmar Emminger. Moreover, 
the European representatives were reluctant to admit to any unofficial 
relationship between the WP3 and the EEC Committee. How did the 
European Countries handle worldwide issues in the WP3 with the EEC 
ideas in the background?
(3)  The WP3 was in a way competitive against the BIS and the IMF, espe-
─────────────────
⑿　Emile Van Lennep (with Evert Schoorl), Working for the World Economy, A Personal History, 
Nederlands Instituut voor het Bank-en Effectenbedrijf, Amsterdam, 1998.
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cially on the recognition of the euro-currency market and the financial 
innovation which emerged at the international capital market. How did 
this competition progress and what was the outcome?
(4)  The reform plan of the international monetary system prepared at the 
WP3 changed in the 1970s, mainly due to the American influence. Ameri-
can representatives, who were not active at the start of WP3 meetings, 
became more influent in the 1970s. What was the role played by the 
United States representatives in the WP3?
(5)  Faced with an oil price upsurge, twice in the 1970s, the WP3 began to 
consider strategies to apply to developing countries and the Communist 
world. These strategies have been in a way challenging the World Bank 
lending scheme to developing countries. At the time of change in the 
Cold War context, how did this thinking work?
In section 1, we overview the organisational features of the WP3, then in 
sections 2 and 3 we follow the discussions in the WP3, throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, in chronological order, before arriving at a conclusion. The chrono-
logical limit of our study, which appears on the subtitle of the paper, 
represents the foundation of the WP3 (1961) and the date of the newest archi-
val record (1978) available up to the present time.
1. What is the WP3?
We shall review briefly the organisational features of the WP3 regarding 
its position in the OECD as well as membership and the culture of the Com-
mittee.
OECD and its Working Groups
In 1961, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
which until then had acted as the agency to receive funds under the Marshall 
Plan, was reorganized into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)⒀. This resulted in forming a venue for consultation by 
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representatives of the fiscal authorities and central banks of the U.S., Europe, 
Japan, and other members across a wide range of levels, from the finance 
minister and governor rank through the level of staff responsible for practical 
operations. Under this organisation, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 
was established as a subsidiary organisation within the OECD Secretariat. 
The EPC included three subcommittees (later to be four). Of these, the 
WP3, which was responsible for currencies and finance, became a venue for 
meetings between leading personnel responsible for practical operations at 
the bureau chief or director level. According to Emile Van Lennep, the found-
ing chairman of the WP3, both the American and the European 
representatives agreed to set up the new working group in the OECD. The 
decision was taken right after the Deutschmark revaluation in March 1961, 
and the WP3 was founded on 19 April 1961⒁. 
Member countries and participating figures of the WP3
After a strong suggestion by the founding chairman Van Lennep, the ini-
tial membership of the WP3 consisted of the EPU countries, including the 
United States and Canada. The autobiography of Van Lennep mentions the 
names of James Tobin　(Council of Economic Advisors), Richard Cooper and 
Ralph Young (FRB) as the US delegates, Sir Dennis Rickett from the UK 
Treasury, Otmar Emminger of Germany and Louis Raminsky from Canada⒂. 
The participating figures in future meetings are also of importance, often 
including key persons in international financial cooperation. After Van Len-
nep, Emminger and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing would lead the decision making 
of WP3. The EPU countries had already established a close relation among 
the member central bankers especially via the BIS meeting⒃. To add the 
United States and Canada while the majority of votes were held by European 
─────────────────
⒀　As for the OEEC, cf. Richard Griffiths, ed., Explorations in OEEC History, OECD, Paris, 1997.
⒁　Van Lennep, Working for the World Economy, op.cit., pp.100-105.
⒂　Ibid., pp.105.
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countries was thus a natural course of evolution from the EPU viewpoint.
The membership of the committee was enlarged in 1964 to include 
Japan, the IMF and the BIS. This time, the matter did not settle naturally. At 
the meeting of the WP3 held on 17th June 1964, Van Lennep, the chairman, 
opening the session, proposed that “Japan, the BIS and the IMF be admitted 
as new members”, insisting that after Japan’s entrance “it was made very 
clear that there were going to be no more increases in membership”. To this 
proposal, Lord Hankey as a chairman of the EPC noted “the admission of 
Japan required a decision of the EPC” and “off the record”, Lord Hankey 
added that “Austria might make some difficulties if she succeeded getting an 
alternate in the EMA”. But Mertens representing the Benelux countries 
replied that “there was undoubtedly some connection between the Working 
Party 3 and the Group of Ten, and that, therefore, the composition of the two 
groups ought to be the same”. After a short intervention by Gocht of Ger-
many, stating that Germany would not take a negative attitude towards an 
application for membership by Austria, Van Lennep repeated bluntly that 
“limit was now reached” and that “Austria should not be given any hope”⒄. 
The session of the WP3 which made the decision on this new membership 
reveals some important features of the group: limited membership, indepen-
dent features of the WP3, and connection between the membership of WP3 
and G10. 
WP3 and G10
During the early years of the WP3, namely the beginning of the 1960s, 
the international financial forums encountered a period of restructuring, along 
─────────────────
⒃　Harold James asseses that “Already in the 1950s, the BIS had organized within the European 
Payments union what amounted to a swap system for European central bankers”. Harold James, 
International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, IMF/ Oxford University Press, London/
New York, 1996, p.160.
⒄　OECD Archives, Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, Record of the Meet-
ing held on 17th June, 1964 at the Chateau de la Muette, Paris, Strictly Confidential.
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with the crisis and “patchwork” of the Bretton Woods System⒅. The forma-
tion of the G10 was the outstanding example of this restructuring. At this 
time, unofficial coordination among nations had been achieved for the emer-
gency loans implemented during the immediately preceding sterling crisis of 
1961. Based on this coordination, the finance ministers and central-bank gov-
ernors of the ten leading industrialized countries decided to meet several 
times a year ‒ while the number of countries participating in these meetings 
later expanded to 11, the organisation continued to be known as the G10. The 
G10 played an important role in rethinking and reforming the Bretton Woods 
System in the 1960s. 
Limiting the G10 members to the above 11 countries was, according to 
Erin Jacobsson (daughter and biography writer of Per Jacobsson, the Manag-
ing Director of the IMF from 1956 to 1963), a proposal of Wilfrid 
Baumgartner, Governor of the Banque de France, with the suggestion of Rob-
ert Roosa of the United States. Baumgartner was said to have proposed that 
G10 membership should consist of “only countries that participated in the 
financing of British [IMF] withdrawals in July 1961”⒆. This initial decision 
seems to have influenced the above WP3 membership.
Incidentally, while the organisations beneath the EPC belonged to the 
OECD Secretariat, the secretariat of the G10 was set up in the BIS. It should 
be noted that while the OECD itself was a public institution founded based 
on a treaty, the decision to hold a meeting of representatives, who were in 
fact of the ranks of finance minister and central-bank governor, of the ten 
nations consisting of only some OECD members, was made through unofficial 
─────────────────
⒅　A general view of the mechanism and collapse of the Bretton Woods System is given in 
Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen, eds., A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: 
Lessons for International Monetary Reform, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993.
⒆　Erin Jacobsson, A Life for Sound Money, Per Jacobsson, His Biography, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1979, p.382. She points to a memo by Gengo Suzuki, Japanese IMF representative, 
as a source for this observation.
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negotiations.
Figure 1 represents the relation among several international forums by 
1964, recognized by the Bank of Japan official at that time. As shown here, 
the vertical line represented organisational relations among forums, while the 
horizontal line existed between forums, either of central banks or of treasur-
ies. The WP3 has been a cornerstone of these relations, putting together 
multilateral surveillance frameworks and OECD bodies.
G10 Financial Ministers’/
Central Bank Governors’ Meeting
G10 Deputies’ Meeting
Ossola Group
“organizational relations”
“close relations”
Source: Bank of Japan Archives
Esteva Group
BIS Central Bank Governors’
Informal Meeting
BIS Gold/Foreign Exchange
Experts’ Meeting
BIS Experts’
Committee on
Monetary Policy
BIS Experts’
Committee on Euro-
Currency Market
BIS Experts’ Committee on
Monetary Aﬀairs
and Statistics
BIS Multilateral Surveillance
Central Bank Governors’ Meeting
BIS Multilateral Surveillance
High Ranking Oﬃcers’ Meeting
OECD 
Ministerial Council
OECD Economic Policy
Committee（EPC）
EPC WP3
Figure 1: International Financial Forums in 1964
Confidentiality and organisational culture
The WP3 being an informal “forum”, its meetings and records have been 
put under strict confidentiality. However, at the beginning of the 1970s, the 
rules and customs on this confidentiality seem to have degraded. We can 
observe how this happened and how the Chairman and the Secretariat tried 
to cope with the situation, from a letter distributed in 1979. The letter, head-
lined “Arrangements to reinforce the confidential character of the WP3” was 
written by Chairman Matsukawa of the WP3 on 12th January 1979. In this let-
ter sent to all member countries, Chairman Matsukawa recalls that the 
arrangements had been agreed “to establish more restrictive arrangements 
concerning attendance and documents, similar to those applied in 1961-67”. In 
order to “give force to this rule”, the Japanese chairman proposed a limit to 
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the number of participants of five or six per country, and moreover, asked 
the secretariat “not to respond to any requests from delegations for deroga-
tions from this rule by providing entrance cards in excess of the appropriate 
number”⒇.
The organisational culture of the WP3 seems to be situated in between a 
“hard law” regime like that of the IMF, and a “soft law” one like that of the 
BIS. “Hard law” system stands on the legal structure of modern democracy, 
supported by voters and taxpayers. The United Nations and the IMF are 
representative examples of the “hard law” system working in the interna-
tional field. A “soft law” system, conversely, does not have a robust legal base 
but rather an informal process of decision makings. The BIS, which stands on 
the central bank cooperation, setting the de facto standard of international 
banking business, is an example of this ambiguous but powerful system21. 
The WP3 was in a way “hard” since it was an organisation legally founded by 
“hard” institution of the OECD. Yet it was in another way “soft” because the 
WP3 had no obligation to publish its decisions for the public, or to respond to 
the member countries’ political bodies. The only organisation to which the 
WP3 had any commitment was the EPC, its mother committee. Moreover, 
the existence of the WP3 itself was not clear to the public. This protection by 
the “soft law” style of organisational culture enabled the WP3 to make inno-
vative policy proposals.
2. WP3 in the 1960s: “the Bretton Woods patchwork”
With its brand new organisational features and brilliant members, the 
WP3 went on “in the process of creating something entirely new and differ-
─────────────────
⒇　OECD Archives, M.Matsukawa, Arrangements to reinforce the confidential character of Work-
ing Party no 3, 12th January 1979.
21　Concerning “hard law” and “soft law” in this context, see Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal, 
“Hard and Soft Law in International Governance” in International Organization, vol.54, no.3, Sum-
mer 2000.
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ent”22. Let us first look at some typical discussions from the 1960s.
Balance of Payments and Adjustment Process
During the early days of the OECD, one of the main themes on agenda 
was capital movement. At the very first meeting of the WP3, held during 
18-19 May 1961, the president Van Lennep drew attention of the participants 
to the subject of “les moyens d’atténuer les conséquences dommageables pour 
la balance des paiements de certains pays des mouvements de capitaux ren-
dus possible par le retour à la convertibilité monétaire”. In other words, the 
WP3 in the early stage of return to convertibility under the Bretton Woods 
System had been somewhat awkward to the change, to be brought about by 
the capital movement. In fact, Van Lennep enumerated the three possible 
cases: “laisser les capitaux se déplacer tout en contrebalançant l’effet produit 
par des opérations de financement appropriées” ;  “coordonner les politiques 
des grands pays en matière de taux d’intérêt, de manière à éviter ou à 
restreindre l’influence de ceux-ci sur les mouvements de capitaux” ; “limiter 
les mouvements par le jeu du contrôle des changes, notamment dans les pays 
dont la balance des paiements est déficitaire”. The document distributed by 
the president for the meeting has also suggested three international political 
goals “dès prochaines années”: transform the UK “base deficit” into surplus, 
reduce the USA “base deficit”, and urge the West Germany to record a cer-
tain “base deficit”23.
However, soon after its start, the WP3 began to take up the question 
from an approach different from those achieved by the previous IOs: not to 
only deal with the BP question from the point of view of macro-economic con-
sultation, but from that of liberalization of capital movement. In this context, 
─────────────────
22　Van Lennep, Working for the World Economy, op.cit., p.107.
23　AEF B68222, Le Directeur du Trésor à Monsieur le Ministre des Finances et des Affaires 
Economiques, Compte rendu de la 1ère séance du groupe de travail No 3 cu Comité de Politique 
Economique de l’O.C.D.E., le 25 mai 1961.
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the WP3 dealt with the “adjustment process”, in which the BP imbalance 
would be adjusted between current account and capital account.
One typical example over the relation between the BP question and the 
capital movement could be found in the discussion in the meeting of the WP3 
on 6th November 196224. Just after the session open, the US representative 
Daane criticized the Secretariat paper as it was “disturbing because it failed 
to present correctly the United States’ interest in the subject of European 
capital markets”. According to Daane the focus of the paper was “much too 
narrow”. After a long speech, he summed up the American position as fol-
lows: 
(1)  The United States is interested in the broad questions that need to be 
raised in connection with European capital markets.
(2)  The United States believes that Working Party No.3 should consider this 
subject from time to time to hear what steps are being taken by the 
countries concerned to develop their markets.
(3)  The United States believes that Working Party No.3 should instruct the 
Secretariat to conduct studies of various capital markets in conjunction 
with the studies already going forward in the Invisibles Committee, and 
the United States has some suggestions as to the types of questions 
these studies should seek to answer.
The main point of the American discussion was “the inter-relationship 
between the development of capital markets and restrictions of capital move-
ments”. Daane concluded, criticizing the French and Italian restriction over 
the capital market, that “the Working Party No.3 was perhaps dismissing too 
lightly the balance-of-payments significance of the capital markets-capital con-
─────────────────
24　OECD Archives, Record of the meeting of Working Party no.3 of the Economic Policy Commit-
tee held on Monday 5th and Tuesday 6th November 1962.
329
Crisis Management in the International Monetary and Financial System: 
OECD Working Party 3 (1961-1979)
1067
trols question” and that “increased capital outflows from surplus countries 
would therefore be needed to compensate for current account surplus; where 
controls persisted, they should be removed”. Against the American criticism, 
the French delegate Pérouse objected that “France’s attitude toward the 
question of capital markets and capital movements was not influenced by its 
balance of payments”. After a debate between American on one side and the 
Europeans on the other, the Chairman summed up the discussion that “the 
United States was urging greater freedom of capital movements” while 
“European members, though agreed on this as a matter of principle, thought 
that the removal of restrictions must come slowly and in conjunction with 
the closer co-ordination of economic policies to prevent undesirable capital 
flows”. 
It is noteworthy that the subject on capital market had been dealt with 
in the WP3 in relation to the BP adjustment problem from the early 1960s, 
and in this phase it was the American who was keen to open the European 
capital markets.
Towards Capital Market Deregulation
As for the BP adjustment, the WP3 adopted the report entitled “Proce-
dure for Study of Adjustment Process”25. Distributed at the meeting held on 
2nd July 1964, the note enumerates the elements which would influence the 
BP adjustment as follows: “interrelationship between Internal Liquidity and 
Balance of Payments”, “Standards of Monetary Policy”, “Use of Fiscal, trade, 
Incomes, and Other Policy Measure…”, “Relationship of Various Types of 
International Liquidity to the Adjustment Process”. After the above chapters 
on the elements concerning the BP adjustment, a chapter deals with “Role of 
Capital Movements and Capital markets in the Adjustment Process”. Under 
─────────────────
25　Bank of Japan Archives, 12929, CPE/WP3(64)22, annex II, “Procedure for Study of Adjustment 
Process”.
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this chapter title, the note indicates that “each delegation to be requested to 
submit a paper setting forth its view of the role of its own capital market in 
the adjustment process”, and “national delegations to be invited to submit 
general papers on this topic”. The “procedure” has been followed by the “Pro-
posals for improving the European capital market”, presented by Robert 
Roosa of the United States26.
An interesting topic in the discussion which followed this “procedure” 
was the “taxes on new security issues”27. The reason why the WP3 member 
countries took up this issue was that these taxes “affect the flow of loanable 
funds from savers to investors, both within countries and between countries”. 
This approach relied on a notion that in many countries “they tend to encour-
age direct links between big firms and financial institutions” of which 
operations are carried “outside the capital market proper”, and thus “militate 
against the development of an efficient capital market”. This situation has 
been supported by taxation on capital operations, and these “dissimilarities 
between the level of such taxes between countries may stimulate interna-
tional capital movements which, depending on the circumstances, can be 
undesirable from the point of view of international payments equilibrium”. 
The discussion over the capital market deregulation in the WP3 evolved from 
the European reluctance in the early 1960s to more market oriented reform 
plan in 1964, focusing on taxation and financial intermediaries.
3. WP3 in the 1970s: forerunner or follower?
The 1970s witnessed the international financial system turmoil that 
began with the Nixon Shock of 1971. 
─────────────────
26　Bank of Japan Archives, 12929, CPE/WP3(64)26, “Proposals for improving the European capital 
market”, 24th August 1964.
27　Bank of Japan Archives, 12929, CPE/WP3(64)25, annex, “Reduction or removal of taxes on new 
security issues”.
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Shock of the Nixon Shock (1971)
The first response of the WP3 to the Nixon statement of August 15, in 
an official term, was expressed by the presse communiqué of the G10, in 16th 
September 1971. In the communiqué, the G10 Ministers and Governors noted 
that the WP3 would prepare an assessment of “the scale of the balance of 
payments adjustment required for the United States and the implications for 
other countries”. The work has been completed in a confidential note by the 
WP3 secretariat, dated 4th October 197128. The note, after assessing the pres-
ent position of the member countries’ BP, aimed “to assess how far the aims 
of the United States are consistent with those of other countries” and to illus-
trate “the scale of adjustment that might be implied for each of the major 
countries”, and to highlight some discussions. The analyses are rather static, 
not dynamic, from contemporary point of view. It was partly due to the theo-
retical level of the economics in those days, but mainly due to the fact that 
they could not foresee the effect of capital movement. The WP3 and the 
OECD themselves would change the bases of discussion by pushing the capi-
tal movement liberalization further.
As for the countries’ opinion, generally speaking, the US representatives 
tended to present an optimist picture of their BP, with the Europeans oppos-
ing it.
The Americans were even optimistic about capital movement, while the 
Europeans tended to strengthen control. For example, in March 1972, at the 
end of a WP3 session, in reply to the question on control over capital move-
ment, Paul Volcker, an eminent American representative, remarked that “les 
inquiétudes des marchés des changes ne sont pas provoquées par le niveau 
actuel des parités mais par la crainte d’une extension des contrôles des mou-
─────────────────
28　OECD Archives, CPE/WP3(71)17, Paris, 4th October 1971, “The Scale of the United States 
Adjustment Problem and the Implications for Other Countries” (Note by the Secretariat), confi-
dential.
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vements de capitaux” [the anxiousness of the exchange markets are not 
provoked by the actual level of parity, but by fear of extension of controls 
over capital movement]. To this statement, the French delegate Claude 
Pierre-Brosolette reacted that “on pourrait soutenir exactement le contraire”, 
[exactly the opposite could have been supported] and that the liberalization of 
capital movement under examination “ne seraient pas de nature à améliorer 
la balance des paiements américaine et à rétablir la confiance dans le dollar”
[is not of the nature to improve the American balance of payment and to 
reestablish the confidence of the dollar]29.
What is noteworthy about the above discussion in the WP3 is that the 
both sides of the debate, American and French, stayed in the framework of 
the fixed exchange-rate system. In other words, the WP3 could not touch the 
“exchange-rate system” angle of the trilemma proposed by Obstfeld and 
Taylor30. Leaving the fixed exchange-rate system as given, their choice had 
been limited between the “free capital movement” and the “independent 
financial policy”. The United States insisted on the former, France claimed 
the latter.
Later on, however, the focus of debate shifted from the American BP 
issue to management of the BP imbalances. The WP3 then started to set a 
certain “aim” or “objective” on the BP of each member country.
Balance of Payments and Adjustment Process in the 1970s
So who proposed this “BP aim” method for the first time in the WP3? As 
far as we can ascertain, it was in May 1972 that the OECD Ministerial Coun-
cil agreed to discuss the BP issues (aims, adjustment and mobile capital 
─────────────────
29　AEF B54755, Note pour ministre, Compte rendu de la reunion du Groupe du travail no 3 de l’
O.C.D.E. les 28 et 29 mars 1972 (Claude Pierre-Brosolette), 7 avril 1972.
30　As for a recent work on the “trilemma”, cf. Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor, “Globalization 
and Capital Market” in NBER Working Paper, Series 8846, 2002.
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flows). The Ministers charged the WP3 with responsibility to prepare reports 
on the subject31. Facing this demand by the Ministerial Council, the reaction 
of the WP3 members varied: the American delegate insisted to “accélerer des 
travaux de manière à ce qu’une première discussion puisse avoir lieu sur ce 
thème dès la fin de l’été” [accelerate the work so that the first discussion on 
the theme could be held by the end of summer], while the British and French 
delegates expressed the view “que ne soient négligés les travaux tradition-
nels du groupe” [the traditional works of the Group shall not be ignored]. 
Another member added that “ces travaux fassent l’objet d’une coordination 
avec ceux menés au sein du Groupe des vingt du FMI” [those works are the 
object of coordination with the works handled in the G20 of the IMF]32. The 
American delegate expressed their positive view on this new method, while 
others expressed a negative view. It should be noted that the American view 
in those days was far from “market oriented” policy which the United States 
would insist in later period. The American government was keen to fix the 
“aims” and manage the BP, not to let it go through market mechanism.
Along with the “BP aims” scheme, in the 1970s, the WP3 took up the BP 
issue in a way quite different from other institutions like the IMF: first of all, 
the WP3 focused on BP imbalances not only among the OECD countries but 
also between developed and less-developed countries; secondly, the WP3 (and 
the OECD as a whole) aimed at free capital movement, and from this point of 
view the WP3 paid interest to adjustment processes, namely adjustment 
between current account and capital account. The secretariat of the WP3 
imposed these directions, although the responses of member countries varied. 
The WP3 September-November 1972 sessions give us an interesting example.
─────────────────
31　AEF B54755, Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, Future Work of the 
Working Party (Note by the Secretariat), Paris, 30th May 1972.
32　AEF B54755, Note pour ministre, Compte rendu de la réunion du Groupe du travail no 3 de 
l’O.C.D.E. les 13 et 14 juin 1972 (Claude Pierre-Brosolette), 20 juin 1972.
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In September 1972, WP3 secretariat presented a report entitled “the Pos-
sible Use of Balance-of-Payments Aims as an ‘Indicator’ of the Need for 
Adjustment”. The questions posed in the report were as follows: (1) How to 
ensure the coherence of BP aims of member countries of the OECD; (2) How 
to improve the adjustment process of BP; and (3) How to reduce the short 
term capital movement. Due to the time limit of the session, only two topics 
(1) and (2) were discussed. The session concluded that (1) although there were 
certain differences between the adjustment objective set by the OECD secre-
tariat and that of each member countries, there was not too much to worry 
about; (2) the OECD secretariat proposed using a middle-term objective of the 
current account balance as an indicator for the BP adjustment, i.e. once the 
BP of a certain country displayed a margin out of the middle-term trend, 
then the country would be encouraged to exert a corrective measure. How-
ever, the member countries “ont généralement critiqué cette approche du 
problème”[have in general criticized this approach to the problem], since the 
middle-term objective has to be compatible among countries concerned, not 
only by a single country adopting the objective. A French delegate, in his 
note to the Finance Minister, reported the discussion “longue et confuse”, 
[“long and confusing”] and criticized the WP3 secretariat report as repeating 
the conclusions already reached in its 1966 report33.
Although the attitude of the member countries was negative on the 
“aims” or “objectives” on the BP, the WP3 secretariat enforced the proposal. 
In the next WP3 session, held on 31st October 1972, the secretariat presented 
a note confirming the following points: (1) the rationale for seeking to estab-
lish BP aims; (2) the relation of targets for development Aid to BP aims; and 
(3) the member countries’ differing philosophies regarding the use of controls 
of capital flows. A summary of the secretariat proposal is as follows:
─────────────────
33　AEF B54755, Note pour le Ministre, objet : Réunion du Groupe du Travail no.3 de l’O.C.D.E. les 
14 et 15 septembre 1972 (Claude Pierre-Brosolette), le 5 octobre 1972.
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(1)  “The logic underlying the WP3’s series of discussions on BP aims springs 
from the fact that different instruments of adjustment affect different 
elements in the BP. In particular, exchange-rate adjustments affect pri-
marily the current account. Individual measures of direct control affect 
either the current or the capital account according to what items are 
subjected to control”.
(2)  “In the world as a whole, the BP surpluses necessarily have a counter-
part in BP deficits so that …the total BP of the world is zero. This, 
however, is only true ex post… If aims are incompatible, one or several 
countries will necessarily be frustrated in reaching its aims and a danger 
will arise of mutually offsetting policies”.
(3)  As for philosophies of the member countries with respect to the capital 
account, the secretariat observed that “some countries have positive 
views as to the desired structure of their BP as being between the cur-
rent and capital account”, while “other countries take the view that 
controls on capital flows, except possibly as a temporary measure, are 
undesirable, either they believe them to be harmful or, alternatively, inef-
fective”34.
The session, after examining the above proposal, “agreed to discuss fur-
ther the possible use of countries’ BP aims as ‘indicators’ of desirable 
adjustment action”, with certain “margins of tolerance”, beyond which it could 
be presumed a country would wish to take adjustment action”35.
─────────────────
34　AEF B54755, Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, Balance-of-Payments 
Aims: Implied Assumptions regarding Capital Flows (Note by the Secretariat), confidential, Paris, 
31st October 1972.
35　AEF B54755, Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, The Possible Use of Bal-
ance-of-Payments Aims as an “Indicator” of the need for adjustment (Note by the Secretariat), 
confidential, Paris, 2nd November 1972.
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However, the thinking of the WP3 stayed within the limit of the fixed 
rate system: the BP aims were tools to manage BP imbalances in the world 
of Smithsonian Agreement, which tried to put the currencies in a framework 
of the Bretton Woods, in vain. The OECD-WP3 would face the collapse of the 
system in a particular way.
First encounter with the floating rate system
The Smithsonian Accord in December 1971 could not keep on standing 
until 1973. The Italian lira and the Japanese yen declared floating in Febru-
ary 1973, and other currencies followed, including the pound sterling. The 
IMF adjustable peg exchange rate system then collapsed and a floating 
exchange system was introduced. 
No one, including the WP3, has ever experienced the floating exchange 
rate as a main rule to work in the international monetary system. In fact, 
when the WP3 began to study the floating exchange rate system from Feb-
ruary 1973, the recognition of the system was not so clear: in a note on the 
“Prospects after the new currency realignment”, the OECD Secretariat 
counted a floating rate system as one of the three “dangers” which could 
result of the realignment, along with the “exchange controls” and “a general 
tendency for exchange rate adjustment to go further than needed to restore 
payment equilibrium”. The report of the WP3 emphasized that “further bouts 
of speculation would seem, not merely possible, but probably inevitable”36.
According to the notion of the WP3 of the time, “the disadvantages of 
unstable rates would be greatest as between close trading partners, e.g. 
within Europe”.
─────────────────
36　OECD Archives, CPE/WP3(73)5, Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, “Pros-
pects after the new currency realignment”, 19 the February 1973.
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The European skepticism to the floating system was followed by future-
looking view of “a common “European” float”, although “any large movement 
in the common exchange rate against the rest of the world heightens ten-
sions resulting from disparities in he positions of countries party to the 
scheme”. On the other hand, the WP3 indicates that “the positive argument 
for floating is that it would eliminate the conditions which permit the building 
up of large private speculative positions”. The report finally concludes that 
“floating would not necessarily have to be clean floating”. Because “there 
could be a case for financing mobile capital flows […]even though the 
exchange rate provided a mechanism which could (at the cost of unwanted 
rate fluctuations) prevent them”37. 
In a session of the WP3 on 5th March 1975, the general impression was of 
“mild optimism” but an American delegate, Benett “strongly denied that his 
country followed a policy of ‘benign neglect’ with respect to the exchange 
rate of the dollar (he also objected to the qualification of the present situation 
as necessarily one of ‘weakness’ of the dollar) and assured the Working party 
that the United States authorities would not reintroduce capital controls”38. 
In the session, Benett repeated that he “did not like the expression ‘weakness 
of the dollar’” and that the trade-weighted exchange rate of the dollar 
remained in a certain range from 1973. The American view at the time was 
that there was no “target zone”, nor “benign neglect” for the dollar rate39.
Oil-dollar recycling
A striking feature of the discussion which took place in the WP3 (and of 
course a striking feature of the 1970s itself) was the energy problem. After 
─────────────────
37　Ibid.
38　BIS Historical Archives, DEA21, FO52, Summary Report on the Meeting of Working Party 
No.3 on 5th March 1975.
39　BIS Historical Archives, DEA21, FO52, Note on the Meeting of Working Party No.3 on 5th 
March 1975, confidential.
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the petroleum price upsurge provoked by the OPEC countries in 1974, the 
WP3 set up an agenda on “oil-money flows, Euro-currency market, direct 
recycling, and recycling through international institutions”40. During the ses-
sion, WP3 members examined the “o il-money flows” mainly flourishing into 
the U.S. Treasury and the Bank of England. All the other subjects on the 
table, namely the Euro-currency market or recycling (direct recycling of capi-
tal between two countries or secondary recycling through a third country) 
concerned “oil-money”. Let us pick up some representative topics.
According to the data presented on the table of the WP3, the oil-money 
flows into the U.S. Treasury during the 8 months from January to August 
1974 totaled 28 billion dollars (of which 13 billion from the Euro-Currency 
market and the rest 7 billion from the U.S. market). During the same period 
the Bank of England gathered 27 billion dollars of the oil-money, of which 12 
billion in London (and of this figure 3.5 in sterling holdings and 8.5 in euro-
currencies). The two Anglo-Saxon markets were thus favored as a reservoir 
for the oil-dollar. Regarding this market move, “some speakers” in the meet-
ing “considered that the market was “saturated” and that the volume of new 
credits should, and would, continue to diminish”. Those speakers “said that 
excessive underpinning of liquidity positions should be avoided”. However, 
“others felt that the market could continue to handle a fairly substantial vol-
ume of credit”. The Chairman of the meeting supported the latter optimistic 
view.
After a long discussion over various subjects, the WP3 reviewed the five 
types of scheme over how to recycle the oil-money, as follows:
(1)  a new investment institution, set up jointly by the oil-consuming and the 
─────────────────
40　OECD Archives, CPE/WP3(74)17, Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, 
Informal Record by the Secretariat of the Working Part’s Meeting on 28th September 1974 in 
Washington, confidential.
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oil-producing countries
(2) a new facility for re-cycling through the IMF
(3) “the General Agreements to Borrow”
(4) a BIS or an OECD-BIS arrangement
(5) borrowing by the European Economic Community
All the above schemes have been examined in the meeting, with the 
IMF and the BIS representative present, and finally the Chairman concluded 
the discussion: the important point of conclusion was that the WP3 “had seen 
much more clearly than six months ago, the limits to the capacity of the 
banking system and the Euro-dollar market, due to the nature of these inter-
mediaries”. Although some speakers supported the scheme of “direct 
recycling” from the oil countries, the Chairman summed up that “this also 
had its limitations and problems”. Finally, the Chairman noticed that “there 
was a consensus on the need in future to rely more on multilateral arrange-
ments”. Neither banking system, nor the Euro-currency market functioned 
effectively, from the viewpoint of the WP3, to recycle the huge amount of oil-
money. The answer to the question was formally the “multilateral 
arrangements” but the direction of the discussion would move toward the 
more thorough deregulation of capital markets.
Conclusion
Let us conclude our paper, although temporarily, responding to the five 
questions asked in the above introduction.
(1)  The OECD in the 1960s was a “Keynesian friendly” institution, with tar-
get-setting and macro-economic planning. Although in the 1970s these 
ideas were politically criticized, the WP3 continued to set targets and 
interfere with the macro-economic policy of member countries through 
“tour d’horizon”. This interventionist culture survived in the WP3, at 
least until the end of the 1970s.
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(2)  In the 1970s the European Countries in the WP3 focused on capital mar-
ket deregulation, with EEC ideas in the background. They were keen to 
open their capital market, and the WP3 agreement was useful as a 
means to persuading each member government.
(3)  The WP3 in relation to the BIS was more liberal, anti-restrictive. On the 
other hand, the WP3 was more European based, anti-dollar hegemony in 
comparison to the IMF. Thus, the WP3 stood in between these two insti-
tutions, one representing the “soft law”, the other the “hard law”.
(4)  The role played by the United States representatives in the WP3 at the 
beginning of the 1960s had been somewhat isolated in coordinating inter-
national financial cooperation. The Americans, however, soon “learned” 
the organisational culture of the WP3, and by the end of the 1970s 
became more agreeable in the WP3. The American attitude seems to 
have reflected the US view on international institutions, especially after 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods System.
(5)  The Cold War context was beyond the scope of this study. Perhaps in 
dealing with the Euro-Currency market and oil-dollar recycling, a new 
thinking on the Cold War might have emerged in the WP3, but this sub-
ject is left to be studied in the future.
